

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~COCOM Document No. 3717.15/5Date: 18th July, 1960

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COORDINATING COMMITTEEMEMORANDUM FROM THE UNITED STATES DELEGATIONconcerningPROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ITEM 1715 (Boron)Reference: COCOM Document 4042

1. The United States Delegation notes the inferences with regard to the strategic nature of boron which have been drawn by the United Kingdom Delegation in COCOM Document 4042. The United States authorities recognize that certain recent events could lead to the inferences drawn by the United Kingdom Delegation. However, the United States authorities have drawn somewhat different conclusions from these developments than has the United Kingdom. After studying the boron situation for some time, the United States authorities have formulated a proposal which would, in their view, take account of recent developments as well as of the desire of certain Member Countries for more liberal treatment for exception cases for quantitatively limited shipments of boron materials to Sino-Soviet bloc countries other than the Soviet Union.

2. With regard to an evaluation of the strategic significance of boron, the United States authorities continue to regard this material as possessing high strategic importance. Experience in the United States has indicated that, although recent developments in the field of boron utilization have not followed precisely the forecasts made at an earlier date, newer developments have in fact reinforced the assessment of its strategic importance. Furthermore, it remains true that the availability of boron in the Sino-Soviet bloc is definitely limited in relation to likely strategic requirements. While some relaxation in boron controls may be justified, certain types of boron material, e.g. boron carbide, can be applied directly to uses of such a highly strategic nature, as to require the retention of normal exceptions procedures. It may further be stated that the United States does not believe that there is any anomaly in supplying boron to Poland in quantities reasonable and necessary to its civilian economy and denying similar exports to the remainder of the bloc. As the Committee is aware, the Polish policy was adopted because of special political circumstances which have no application elsewhere in the bloc. The United States authorities do not believe that there is any justification at the present time for extending the special Polish policy to any of the other satellites or that exceptions approved for export to Poland provide any justification for similar exceptions to other bloc destinations.

3. The following proposal has been formulated after having given consideration to certain proposals made by the Italian Delegation at the time of the last annual List Review (COCOM Document 3717.15/1-4) as well as to the views expressed by the United Kingdom in its recent memorandum (COCOM Document 4042). The United States authorities would expect that if its proposal should meet with Committee favor, no further discussion of the embargo status of boron would be required during the forthcoming List Review.

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4. The United States Delegation proposes that the following Note be added to Item 1715:

NOTE: Governments may authorize as administrative exceptions the export to Sino-Soviet bloc destinations, other than the USSR, of boron materials covered by 1715 (a), (d) (1), and of boric oxide in (d) (2), where the exporting Government is convinced that the shipment will not be re-exported from the country of destination and will be used only for the manufacture of products for civilian end use, and

- (1) Either the exporting Government can clearly demonstrate to the Committee that during the calendar year concerned it has received or will be receiving from the Sino-Soviet bloc destination concerned imports which contain an amount of boron equivalent to that being exported, or
- (2) The proposed shipment does not exceed \$1000 in value, and no Government will make more than 10 such shipments during a calendar year to the entire Sino-Soviet bloc.

Details of such licenses or authorizations under sub-paragraphs (1) and (2), including evidence of the demonstration established in (1) above and a statement of the specific civilian end-use shall be reported promptly to the Committee. This note is valid for one year and the unanimous consent of the Committee is required to extend for an additional year.

5. Should the foregoing proposal be adopted, it would, of course, be necessary to pro-rate the quantity limits set forth in sub-paragraph (2) of the Note for the remainder of 1960.

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